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Process Serving 102 – Case Law

PS 102 – Understanding Case Summaries
PS 102 – Chapter 1 – An Introduction to Personal Service Case Law
1 Topic
PS 102 – Chapter 1 – Article 1 – Personal Service Held Invalid – Gross vs Sunding
PS 102 – Chapter 2 – An Introduction to Abode Service
9 Topics
PS 102 – Chapter 2 – Article 1 – Abode Service Upheld – Lino vs Hole
PS 102 – Chapter 2 – Article 2 – Abode Service Upheld – Chase v. Starkweather
PS 102 – Chapter 2 – Article 3 – Abode Service Upheld – Sheldon v Fettig
PS 102 – Chapter 2 – Article 4 – Abode Service Held Invalid – McCann v. Orth
PS 102 – Chapter 2 – Article 5 – Abode Service Upheld – Wichert vs Cardwell
PS 102 – Chapter 2 – Article 6 – Abode Service Held Invalid – Farmer vs Davis
PS 102 – Chapter 2 – Article 7 – Abode Service Held Invalid – Salts vs Estes
PS 102 – Chapter 2 – Article 8 – Abode Service Held Invalid – Gerean v. Martin-Joven
PS 102 – Chapter 2 – Article 9 – Abode Service Held Invalid – Blankenship v. Kaldor
PS 102 – Chapter 3 – An Introduction to Immunity from Service Case Law
2 Topics
PS 102 – Chapter 3 – Article 1 – Immunity from Service – State ex rel Gunn v. Superior Court
PS 102 – Chapter 3 – Article 2 – Immunity from Service – Anderson vs Ivarsson
PS 102 – Chapter 4 – An Introduction to Due Diligence Case Law
6 Topics
PS 102 – Chapter 4 – Article 1 – Due Diligence – Brennan vs Hurt
PS 102 – Chapter 4 – Article 2 – Due Diligence – Painter v. Olney
PS 102 – Chapter 4 – Article 3 – Due Diligence – Chase v. Carney
PS 102 – Chapter 4 – Article 4 – Due Diligence – Parkash vs Perry
PS 102 – Chapter 4 – Article 5 – Due Diligence – Carras v Johnson
PS 102 – Chapter 4 – Article 6 – Due Diligence – Wells Fargo v Ngy
PS 102 – Chapter 5 – An Introduction to Non Resident Motorist Act Case Law
3 Topics
PS 102 – Chapter 5 – Article 1 – Non Resident Motorist Act – Martin v Meier
PS 102 – Chapter 5 – Article 2 – Non Resident Motorist Act – Harvey v Obermeit
PS 102 – Chapter 5 – Article 3 – Non Resident Motorist Act – Martin vs Triol
PS 102 – Chapter 6 – An Introduction to Evasion of Service Case Law
5 Topics
PS 102 – Chapter 6 – Article 1 – Evasion of Service – State vs Vahl
PS 102 – Chapter 6 – Article 2 – Evasion of Service – Weiss vs Glemp
PS 102 – Chapter 6 – Article 3 – Evasion of Service – Diversified Wood vs Johnson
PS 102 – Chapter 6 – Article 4 – Evasion of Service – United Pacific Insurance vs Discount Company
PS 102 – Chapter 6 – Article 5 – Evasion of Service – Mann vs Hobbick
PS 102 – Chapter 7 – An Introduction to Defendant Instructed Service Case Law
1 Topic
PS 102 – Chapter 7 – Article 1 – Instructed Service – Thayer vs Edmonds
PS 102 – Chapter 8 – An Introduction to Service on an Entity Case Law
4 Topics
PS 102 – Chapter 8 – Article 1 – Service on an Entity – Dolby vs Worthy
PS 102 – Chapter 8 – Article 2 – Service on an Entity – Lybbert vs Grant County
PS 102 – Chapter 8 – Article 3 – Service on an Entity – Reiner vs Pittsburg Des Moines Corp
PS 102 – Chapter 8 – Article 4 – Service on an Entity – Weber vs Associated Surgeons
PS 102 – Chapter 9 – An Introduction to Time Computation Case Law
1 Topic
PS 102 – Chapter 9 – Article 1 – Time Computation – Stikes Woods vs City of Lacey
PS 102 – Chapter 10 – An Introduction to Who May Serve Case Law
2 Topics
PS 102 – Chapter 10 – Article 1 – Who May Serve – Brown-Edwards vs Powell
PS 102 – Chapter 10 – Article 2 – Who May Serve – Scanlan vs Townsend
PS 102 – Chapter 11 – An Introduction to Statutes of Limitation
1 Topic
PS 102 – Chapter 11 – Article 1 – Statute of Limitations – Sidis vs Brodie Dohrmann Inc
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PS 102 – Chapter 8 – Article 4 – Service on an Entity – Weber vs Associated Surgeons

Process Serving 102 – Case Law PS 102 – Chapter 8 – An Introduction to Service on an Entity Case Law PS 102 – Chapter 8 – Article 4 – Service on an Entity – Weber vs Associated Surgeons

Weber vs Associated Surgeons
166 Wn.2d 161
No. 82163-1

Facts

Weber claimed he suffered injuries from the medical attention he received from Dr. Michael Moore in November of 2002. Dr. Moore was a shareholder of defendant Associated Surgeons at that time.

At the end of 2004, Associated Surgeons stopped providing services. However, although seemingly out of business, it continued as an active corporate entity. It was registered with the Secretary of State in Olympia and their corporate information displayed on the Secretary of State’s website.

The registered agent for Associated Surgeons was Dr. Greg Luna. He remained the registered agent of record even after the defendant entity ceased operations.

Dr. Luna later became a shareholder and began practicing with the Inland Vascular Institute.

In 2006, Weber sought to serve defendant Associated Surgeons with a summons and complaint. Having discovered Dr. Luna was still the registered agent and was now keeping his office at Inland Vascular Institute, sought to have the defendant served at their offices.

Service was made at Inland Vascular by leaving the papers with that company’s practice manager, Carol Braaten.

Associated Surgeons moved for summary judgment against the plaintiff arguing Braaten was not their employee and that she worked for Inland Vascular. Braaten provided a supporting affidavit describing her duties as being in charge of Inland Vascular’s day to day administration of practice and personnel. She went on to state that Dr. Luna was a shareholder and practicing physician with Inland Vascular. Finally, she pointed out that she did not schedule Dr. Luna’s appointments and was not routinely involved in any of his medical, diagnostic, or clinical work.

Judicial History

The trial court ruled that Braaten was not authorized to accept service on behalf of Dr. Luna and granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case.

The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals which supported the trial court’s ruling by holding the service invalid and affirming the dismissal of the case.

The plaintiff appealed again to the Supreme Court which overturned the lower courts’ rulings and remanding the case back to the trial court for appropriate action as an active case. The Supreme Court held the service valid and that jurisdiction by the trial court had been obtained over the defendant in this manner.

Specific Issues

Did service on the registered agent’s office manager satisfy the requirements of RCW 4.28.080(9)? Yes

Reasoning

The Court first looked to RCW 4.28.080(9) which states:

(9) If against a company or corporation other than those designated in subsections (1) through (8) of this section, to the president or other head of the company or corporation, the registered agent, secretary, cashier or managing agent thereof or to the secretary, stenographer or office assistant of the president or other head of the company or corporation, registered agent, secretary, cashier or managing agent.

Holdings

This subsection defines how service of obtained upon an entity such as the defendant in this case. The Court concluded that:

  • The statute does not require the corporation’s registered agent or the registered agent’s secretary, stenographer, or office assistant to work for the defendant.
  • Dr. Luna was the registered agent for the defendant Associated Surgeons.
  • Ms. Braaten was the manager of the practice where Dr. Luna worked.
  • Dr. Luna was a shareholder physician at the practice.

The fact Ms. Braaten did not personally deal with Dr. Luna’s schedule did not preclude her from being his office assistant.

Based on these conclusions the Court ruled the service was in conformance with the statute and, as such, gave the trial court jurisdiction over the defendant Associated Surgeons.

C4PSE Comment

This ruling is of considerable value and interest to professional process servers as it gives greater clarity to 4.28.080(9).

In the past there was some concern as to how strictly the Court might interpret the titles “secretary, stenographer or office assistant.” This concern was heightened as the number of employee position titles expanded. For instance, would the Court accept that an executive assistant was equivalent an office assistant for the purposes of service under this RCW?

Based on this ruling it appears the Court would accept them as equivalent.

This means the Court is looking more to the duties and responsibilities of the secretary or assistant as opposed to the title given the person.

With this said it is vital to remember that rulings on service issues are fact specific and that a change in the facts could result in a different ruling.

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