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PS 102 – Chapter 2 – Article 3 – Abode Service Upheld – Sheldon v Fettig

SUMMARY
Sheldon v. Fettig, et al., 129 Wn.2d. 601 (1996)

Facts

Ms. Fettig and Ms. Sheldon were involved in a car accident in Washington State. Sheldon filed suit for damages and served process at the home of Fettig’s parents in Seattle, where a copy of the summons and complaint was left with Fettig’s brother.

Eight months before process was served, Fettig relocated to Chicago to attend a flight attendant program. Prior to moving, she had lived on her own for 2-3 years in Seattle and Renton. Immediately before leaving for Chicago she moved back into her parent’s Seattle home for approximately 2 months.

Fettig used her parent’s address:

  1. As a place to be contacted before, during and after the 2 months she lived at her parent’s residence.
  2. As her address when registering as a Washington State voter.
  3. When she received a speeding ticket.
  4. As the address for her car’s registration, bill of sale, and on her car insurance.

Upon completion of the flight attendant program in Chicago, Fettig leased an apartment for 13 months and had her mail sent to Chicago. She joined a health club and opened a checking account. Fettig kept her Washington State driver’s license (with her Renton address) and remained registered to vote in Seattle.

As an on-call flight attendant she returned to her parent’s home frequently when not in flight. During the month service was made, Fettig spent 4-5 days at her parent’s home. Fettig was there when Sheldon’s attorney called, and when Sheldon’s attorney sent correspondence, a response was given immediately.

Judicial History
Superior Court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment and rebuffed defense’s claim of improper service of process, holding that service at the defendant’s parents’ home where a copy of the summons and complaint was left with defendant’s brother satisfied substitute service of process requirements.

Court of Appeals affirmed trial court decision, holding that plaintiff had effected valid substitution of process. Supreme Court affirms the Court of Appeals and remands the case to the trial court.

Specific Issue:
Is the Fettig family home in Renton Fettig’s house of usual abode for service of process pursuant to RCW 4.28.0080 (16). Yes

Holdings

House of usual abode in RCW 4.28.080(15) is to be liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold jurisdiction of the court.
The underlying purpose of RCW 4.28.080(15) is to provide a means to serve defendants in a fashion reasonably calculated to accomplish notice.

The term “usual place of abode” must be taken to mean such center of one’s domestic activity that service left with a family member is reasonably calculated to come to one’s attention within the statutory period for the defendant to appear.

Indiciations of a center of domestic activity include where a person is registered to vote, the address given in registering an automobile, the address noted on a bill of sale, the address shown on a traffic citation, the address given to an automobile insurer, and where the defendant is frequently present.

In appropriate circumstances a defendant may maintain more than one house of usual abode if each is center of domestic activity where it would be most likely that defendant would promptly receive notice if the summons where left there.

Reasoning

Since Fettig used the family home for so many indications of a center of domestic activity, it is fair to conclude it is a center of her domestic activity. Also, the family home was the place where Fettig was most likely to receive notice of the pendency of a suit. Fettig, working as a flight attendant jetting across the country is a quintessential example of a highly mobile person splitting her time between two places. She maintained two places of usual abode.

There are fact patterns in which serving a defendant at her parent’s home when she lives elsewhere would not constitute sufficient service of process. See Lepeska v. Parley, 67 Wn. App. 548, 838 P.2d 437 (1992); Thoenes v. Tatro, 270 Or. 775, 529 p.2d 912 (1974).

C4PSE Comment

This is an interesting, though not uncommon, situation that process servers need to be aware of and ensure that their notes support their declaration/affidavit. The details of the process server’s conversation at the door with the defendant’s brother would prove very important in maintaining the validity of the service.

When encountering a situation like this it is vital that the process server update the client with any details which would either support or threaten the service.

When determining whether or not a defendant has more than one center of domestic activity is highly dependent upon the exact circumstances. A minor change in the facts could force the court to invalidate a service instead of upholding it.